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A RIGHT TURN AT THE SUPREME COURT
Fall Schedule Will Be a Test of Conservatism
Voting Rights, Desegregation, Term Limits Among Decisions
USA Today Monday July 3, 1995
Copyright 1995. USA TODAY
Tony Mauro
The Supreme Court's conservative majority,
which emerged with consistent strength in the term
that ended last week, will have the chance to test its
vitality again in the fall with a new crop of
controversial cases.
Cases involving gay rights, race-based
redistricting and product liability dominate the
docket of cases carried over to the court's next term,
beginning Oct. 2.
Many of the key cases from last term were
decided by 5-4 victories in which conservatives
carried the day.
The three core conservatives are Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas. More often than not, they were joined by
Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor.
Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer form the
moderate wing of the court, with none of them
qualifying for the "liberal" label.
"This term saw a dramatic shift with the
conservatives not only exerting more control, but also
engaging in judicial activism by striking down laws
and policies," said Georgetown University law
professor Louis Michael Seidman.
The narrow margins point up the importance of
future vacancies, adds Seidman: "A lot turns on
future appointees and the 1996 election." Rumors
circulated of a justice retiring last week, but the
term ended with all nine still there.
The Supreme Court has already agreed to
consider 33 new cases in the fall term, including:
-- Gay rights: Colorado is seeking to revive its
Amendment 2, passed by voters in 1992, which
invalidates any state or local law prohibiting
discrimination against lesbians, gay men and
bisexuals. The amendment was struck down as a
violation of the constitutional rights of gays.
-- Redistricting: Following up on its decision
Thursday, the Supreme Court will scrutinize
redistricting in Texas and North Carolina to
determine if they amount to racial gerrymandering.
-- Punitive damages: The court will consider
imposing limits on punitive damages in product
liability lawsuits in an Alabama case. A Birmingham
doctor won $4 million in punitive damages from
BMW after claiming that the new car he purchased
in 1990 had actually been damaged and refinished
before it was sold as new.
-- Liquor ads. A Rhode Island law that bars the
advertising of liquor prices will be scrutinized to see
if it violates the First Amendment rights of
advertisers.
-- Agent Orange. The court will decide if
private companies that manufactured Agent Orange
defoliant for the government are immune from being
held liable for injuries suffered by Vietnam veterans.
In addition to these, cases involving gays in the
military, all-male military schools and affirmative
action may be added in the fall.
Key rulings from the Supreme Court term that
ended Thursday:
VOTING RIGHTS: Race cannot be the
primary factor in redrawing congressional districts,
the court ruled on June 29. The justices struck
down majority-minority districts in Georgia, a
decision that could affect many black Congress
members.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: Federal programs
giving preference to minorities in hiring and
contracts will be scrutinized under a new standard
that makes them harder to enact and maintain because
of a June 12 ruling.
ADVERTISING: On April 19, the court struck
down a federal rule that barred brewers from
displaying the alcohol strength of their beers on
labels.
Two months later, the court went in a different
direction in the case of lawyers, upholding a Florida
restriction on lawyer solicitation of accident victims.
TERM LIMITS: The grass-roots movement to
limit the terms of Congress members through state
ballot initiatives came to a halt May 22, when the
court said that could only be done through a
constitutional amendment.
CHURCH-STATE: The University of Virginia
violated the free speech rights of students when it
denied funding for a Christian student newspaper. The
court ruled June 29 in a case filed by student Ronald
Rosenberger.
A similar ruling, on the 29th, said Ohio could not
prevent the Ku Klux Klan from erecting a cross in a
park near the state Capitol.
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ENDANGERED SPECIES: The Interior - Least likely allies: Stevens and Thomas voted
Department has broad power to protect the habitats together in 11% of split decisions.
of endangered species, even on private property, the
Supreme Court ruled June 29.
DRUG-TESTING: School programs that require
student athletes to be tested for drug use are
constitutional, the court said on June 26. The testing
had been challenged as warrantless searches, barred
by the Bill of Rights.
DESEGREGATION: States and local
governments will have an easier time ending
court-ordered school desegregation efforts as a result
of a June 12 ruling involving Kansas City, Mo.
CONGRESS: A federal law barring the possession
of firearms near schools was struck down April 26.
The decision was the first time in more than 50
years that the court struck down a federal law that
had been justified as an exercise of congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce.
PRISONS: Lawsuits filed by prisoners protesting
prison conditions were restricted in a June 19 ruling.
GAYS/PARADE: Organizers have a right to
exclude homosexuals from Boston's St. Patrick's Day
parade in a June 19 ruling.
ANONYMOUS SPEECH: The rights of
individuals to speak anonymously, which could have
implications on cyberspace speech, was upheld by the
court April 19, when it struck down an Ohio law
barring anonymous campaign leaflets.
HONORARIA: A law that barred federal
employees from accepting honoraria for speeches and
articles was struck down Feb. 22 on First
Amendmentgrounds.
'94-'95 TERM
-- Signed opinions: 82 - the fewest since the early
1950s
-- Unanimous votes: 34
- 5-4 votes: 16
-- Only case with a 9-0 and a 5-4 vote: Court said
states cannot impose excise tax on an Indian tribe's
on-reservation gasoline sales, but states can impose
income tax on tribal members who work for the tribe
on its reservation but live elsewhere.
- Most majority opinions written: William Rehnquist,
11
-- Most dissenting opinions written: John Paul
Stevens, 16
- Most likely allies: Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas voted together in 83% of signed
decisions that split the court.
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VOTING CONTROL SHIFTS TO RIGHT ON HIGH COURT
The Baltimore Sun
Copyright 1995 The Baltimore Sun Company
Sunday, July 2, 1995
Lyle Denniston
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington -- With a combination of power and
solidarity seldom seen on the modern Supreme Court,
the five most conservative justices swept through the
just-ended term, leaving in their wake a major
overhaul of the nation's law.
In nine months of activity rivaling the
conservative intensity shown since January by the
Republican-led Congress just across the street, the
five justices who held voting control at the court chose
to exercise it often, freely and boldly.
Dramatic constitutional change came regularly,
right up through Thursday, when the court finished in
a flourish and left town for the summer. This was the
work primarily of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
Just as conservatives in Congress this year have
moved energetically to roll back decades of liberal
social legislation, the court's conservatives frequently
cast their votes together to roll back and even to cast
aside liberal constitutional precedents.
Mark Tushnet, a Georgetown University law
professor, said the court's term amounted to "a
repudiation of post-New Deal constitutional law: that
it is constitutionally permissible for government to act
to alter background social conditions. There is a lot to
indicate that the majority doesn't agree with that
anymore."
The effect of the conservative trends during the
term: a major curtailment of civil rights precedents,
especially those in favor of "affirmative action"
programs and race-based legislative redistricting.
Holding together on the other side of the high
court, with equal fervor and commitment, were its
more liberal members - Justices Stephen G. Breyer,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter and John Paul
Stevens.
To some observers, the conservatives' solidarity
-- unusual in a court that often scatters in varied
ideological positions -- was a reaction to the firmness
of the liberal bloc's unity.
Paul Cappuccio, a former law clerk to Justices
Kennedy and Scalia and now a Washington lawyer,
suggested last week that "it took all five of the
conservatives to do anything" because they had to
contend with "a solid liberal bloc." When staying
together to counter the liberals, the conservatives
"tended to be more forceful," he said.
COURT'S DYNAMICS
The liberal bloc gained a more or less committed
member this past term with the arrival of Justice
Breyer, President Clinton's second appointee. Justice
Ginsburg, another liberal-leaning Clinton choice,
showed a year earlier that the bloc had "the intellectual
power to mix it up" with the conservatives, as Mr.
Cappuccio saw the court's dynamics developing. The
conservatives had a stronger sense "of what they were
voting against," he said.
Liberal advocacy groups noticed, with some
anxiety, the same conservative solidarity. The People
for the American Way's legal director, Elliot
Mincberg, for example, said the just-completed term
"was marked by conservative judicial activism."
For liberal observers, in fact, the term's overall
results had a distinctly threatening tone. "All in all,"
said the American Civil Liberties Union's legal
director, Steven R. Shapiro, "it's been a disappointing
year that ended on an extremely ominous note."
He was referring to the court's final day, when the
justices imposed strict new limits on the creation of
black-dominated election districts and eased
considerably the long-standing ban on government
support of religion.
Conservative organizations, by contrast, appeared
to be largely pleased with the results. Mathew D.
Staver, president and general counsel of Liberty
Counsel, a legal advocacy group based in Orlando,
Fla., said: "I think it's a distinctly more conservative
court ... a little bit more traditionally conservative."
He noted with approval the court's growing
skepticism about "federal government involvement in
state and local issues."
But, he cautioned, conservatives cannot rely
heavily upon the trends of last term, "because the
decisions are so close: the votes are just one vote
apart."
SAME LINEUP LIKELY
As the term ended, there was no sign that any
justice, from either the court's left or right, would
retire this summer. Another term is likely with the
same lineup as the court faces new appeals dealing
with gay rights, women's rights and voters' rights.
Should there be a vacancy on the court next year,
late in the term or after it concludes next summer, it is
doubtful that the Republican-controlled Senate would
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approve a new Clinton nominee. The Senate could
leave the vacancy to be filled after a new presidential
election in November 1996.
There is clear precedent for that: Republican
senators filibustered into extinction President Lyndon
B. Johnson's attempt in 1968 to name a replacement
for retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren. They saved the
chief justiceship for newly elected President Richard
M. Nixon to fill in 1969 with Warren E. Burger.
While the term just closed did illustrate the
conservative justices' power, it also showed the
narrowness with which those five hold command --
and thus signaled the importance of the court's future
as an issue in the presidential campaign.
Of 84 votes cast to decide cases in the term, 16
were by 5-4 votes, according to a statistical study of
the term by David F. Pike, Supreme Court analyst for
a lawyers' newspaper, the Los Angeles Daily Journal.
KENNEDY AND O'CONNOR
A significant element in those 5-4 votes was the
influence of two justices who tended to vote more
conservatively during the term: Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, who are considered to be the most
moderate within the conservative bloc.
Those two voted together in the majority in 11 of
the 16 decisions settled by 5-4 votes. One or the other
of them was in the majority in all 16 -- a clear
indication that, no matter who the other four making
up a majority were, either Justice Kennedy or Justice
O'Connor was necessary to make a fifth.
And, usually, the five-justice majorities that
formed in the most important decisions included both
of them. That was true of the affirmative action ruling,
the decision limiting the use of race in drawing
congressional districts, and the most important ruling
on the subject of government subsidies for religion.
Those two helped form the thin majority in one of
the most conservative decisions of the term, striking
down a federal law that outlawed carrying a gun in or
near a school - a warning to Congress that the court
may curb social legislation that interfered with states'
rights.
And Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were among
the five who voted to put strict new limits on federal
judges' power to act boldly to try to end lingering
racial segregation in public schools.
Only one of the court's major 5-4 rulings could be
described as having a liberal result: the decision to bar
the states, Congress and the people as voters from
limiting congressional terms. Justice Kennedy joined
the four liberals in that case; Justice O'Connor
dissented with the conservatives.
Overall, however, Justice Kennedy appeared to be
moving noticeably toward the conservative side during
the term. And, as Professor Tushnet remarked
recently, it seems that "the Constitution is what
Anthony Kennedy says."
The Daily Journal's Mr. Pike found in the voting
patterns a sign of Justice Kennedy's more conservative
leanings: His most common pairing was with Justice
Thomas, who votes consistently as the court's most
conservative member. They were together in 73 out of
the 84 total votes, according to the Daily Journal
figures.
A MORE CENTRIST POSITION
Justice O'Connor was less an ally of Justice
Thomas' in the voting, an indication that she
maintained a somewhat more centrist position. She
voted most often - 64 times -- with Justice Kennedy
and Justice Souter. Her fewest vote pairings were with
Justice Thomas (59) and Justice Stevens (51) -
notably, the most conservative and the most liberal
justices.
Either Justice Kennedy or Justice O'Connor was
available as an ally when the court's liberals were able
to form a majority of five or more in major cases:
Justice Kennedy on the 5-4 vote against term limits;
both of them on a 6-3 vote to nullify a federal ban on
honorariums for rank-and-file government employees;
both on a 7-2 decision to strike down a state ban on
anonymous political literature; both in the unanimous
ruling to allow parade organizers to keep out marchers
with views the organizers oppose; and both in the 6-3
decision allowing the government to outlaw private
actions that disturb the habitat of wildlife on the
government's endangered species list.
In addition, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
joined with a unanimous court in one significant
liberal decision written by Justice Thomas: a
requirement that police must knock and announce
themselves before entering a home to carry out a
search.
THE CONSERVATIVE SWEEP
The Supreme Court's most important decisions of
the term wit41h conservative outcomes, shwig h
vote split:
* Black-dominated election districts are
unconstitutional if they were formed mainly to
promote racial gerrymandering (5-4).
* Federal affirmative action plans are to be struck
down if they cannot satisfy the strictest constitutional
limits on the use of race as a decisive factor (5-4).
* State universities act unconstitutionally if they
allow some student publications to share in student
activity fees but deny those fees to religious
publications (5-4).
* Congress exceeded its constitutional powers
when it passed a law making it a crime to possess a
gun at a school or nearby (5-4).
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* Public schools may order the surprise drug
testing of student athletes, even those not suspected of
using drugs, if the school seems to have a drug
problem (6-3).
* State and local governments may not bar
religious holiday displays from public property that is
open to other displays, unless a display suggests that
the government endorses the religious symbolism
(7-2).
* Federal judges overseeing the desegregation of
a formerly segregated public school system must
strictly limit the remedies they impose to schools in
the city, and not reach out to the suburbs to draw in
whites (5-4).
* States may put strict limits on "ambulance
chasing" by lawyers seeking to drum up business from
accident or disaster victims (5-4).
* Prison inmates can go to court to challenge the
warden's rules on such things as solitary confinement
only in rare situations (5-4).
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SUPREME COURT RULINGS HERALD REHNQUIST ERA
Los Angeles Times
Copyright, Los Angeles Times 1995
Sunday, July 2, 1995
David G. Savage
Times Staff Writer
By sad coincidence, the Supreme Court
announced the final rulings of this year's term on the
day that former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was
laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery.
But the ceremony in a sense could also have
symbolized the passing of the torch to his successor,
because more than ever, this was the year of the
Rehnquist Court.
In 1972, when then-Justice William H. Rehnquist
joined the high court, both friends and critics marveled
at how the 47-year-old jurist's conservative principles
were fixed in his mind.
Alone on the high court, he championed
"federalism"-the theory that the Constitution reserves
most power for state and local governments and not
Congress and the federal agencies.
He scoffed at "affirmative action," believing it
was nothing more than illegal reverse discrimination.
And he mocked as wrongheaded Thomas Jefferson's
comment that the Constitution demands "a wall of
separation between church and state."
In his early years, Rehnquist was dubbed the
court's "Lone Ranger"-personally charming, a brilliant
lawyer, but decidedly out of touch with contemporary
legal thinking.
But in the 1994-95 term that ended on Thursday,
the Rehnquist Court moved dramatically to imprint in
law his once-out-of-date notions.
Controlling the 5-4 majority, the chief justice
undercut the power of Congress to meddle in local
affairs, dealt a crippling blow to government
affirmative action and opened the door for
religious-rights activists to get public funding on the
same basis as other groups.
On matters both large and small, the conservative
coalition held together this term. The justices gave
states leeway to reduce welfare payments to large
households, made it harder for prison inmates to file
lawsuits, said wardens could revoke annual parole
hearings for long-term inmates and dismantled an
innovative but costly desegregation program in
Kansas City.
They gave school officials the power to impose
drug tests on their students, but crippled the authority
of lawmakers to create black-majority electoral
districts.
They strengthened the free-speech rights of
Christian legal activists who want to display religious
symbols on public property, but they cut back the
free-speech rights of "ambulance chasing" lawyers
who want to send solicitation letters to accident
victims.
"There's no question this is really the 'Rehnquist
Court' at work," said USC law professor Erwin
Chemerinsky. "It is a conservative court following an
activist agenda."
Added Stanford University law professor
Kathleen Sullivan: "This year will be remembered for
the sharp turn to the right on race and religion. The
court's own language was often quite dramatic and
quite sweeping," and its rulings "roll back the use of
race in all three branches of government."
For liberals, this term offered only two significant
victories, but neither is likely to chart a direction for
the future.
On a 5-4 vote, the court struck down state laws
that set term limits for congressional representatives.
Abandoning his conservative colleagues, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy said he believed strongly in
"federalism," but insisted that terms for members of
Congress must be set at the national level, not by each
state.
And on Thursday, the court on a 6-3 vote rejected
the timber industry's claim that the Endangered
Species Act was not intended to limit development on
private land.
This rather startling contention, raised more than
20 years after the law's passage, was too extreme for
the court's moderate conservatives, Kennedy and
Sandra Day O'Connor.
Still, the Republican-controlled Congress can
certainly overturn that decision by revising the law,
and it may well do so.
By contrast, the court's rulings on affirmative
action, desegregation, redistricting, religion and drug
testing, are based on the Constitution and cannot be
altered by lawmakers.
Civil rights lawyers say they are stunned at the
sweep of this term's rulings, but no one can be
surprised at the direction of the court under
Rehnquist's leadership.
In April, Rehnquist took a seemingly minor case
involving a gun found near a school and used it to
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announce a landmark ruling on the power of
Congress.
Speaking for the 5-4 majority, he struck down the
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the
grounds that Congress did not have constitutional
power to enact such a law. The Constitution says
Congress may "regulate commerce . . among the
several states," he said, but this power does not give
federal lawmakers the authority to meddle in local
matters, such as a gun crime near a school.
The ruling in United States vs. Lopez marked the
first time in 60 years that the high court threw out a
federal law as exceeding Congress' power. It last
happened the year the court's so-called "Nine Old
Men" threw out the minimum-wage laws and
invalidated much of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
New Deal.
While no one knows whether Rehnquist's opinion
in the Lopez case is the beginning of a states-rights
trend or a one-time reminder that Congress' power has
limits, constitutional scholars say it has shaken up the
traditional thinking.
In recent decades, many constitutional law classes
do not even teach about the "commerce clause"
because it has been a settled issue since 1937.
Congress, it was said, could regulate any aspect of
American life if it believed that doing so was in the
national interest. Suddenly, that legal truism is no
longer true.
"Rehnquist wrote a classic opinion for the court.
It is clear, broad and speaks with authority," Yale
University law professor Akhil Amar said of the
ruling in the Lopez case. "When you're a law
professor, the first thing you think of is: 'Will this be
a good case to teach?' The answer is definitely yes for
Lopez."
On a practical level, the ruling is already setting
offsparks in the lower courts. Some legal experts say
they think that recent federal laws on drug possession
and orotecting abortion clinics are in danger because
they may exceed Congress' power.
Said Eliot Mincberg, legal director for the
civil-liberties group People for the American Way:
"The conservative activist majority on the court is
more willing to limit congressional power than any
court we've seen since the New Deal."
The rulings on affirmative action, racial
gerrymandering and religion are also sure to
reverberate in the lower courts.
In Adarand vs. Pena, Rehnquist assigned the
majority opinion to his Stanford Law School
classmate, O'Connor, who said "all racial
classifications" by the government are highly suspect
and generally unconstitutional.
Her opinion puts in jeopardy every federal
program that explicitly uses race as a criterion for
awarding contracts or jobs.
While the court did not finally close the door to
federal affirmative action, it came close. "The best you
can say is that the door is slightly ajar," Sullivan said.
On Thursday, the same five-member conservative
majority united to strike a blow at "racial
gerrymandering." In Miller vs. Johnson, the court
struck down a Georgia district drawn to create a black
majority and ruled that lawmakers may not use race as
"the predominant factor" in drawing district lines.
Over the years, Rehnquist has consistently
disputed the view that the First Amendment's ban on
an "establishment of religion" means that the
government must keep church and state entirely
separate. While he agrees that the government cannot
fund a state church or favor one religion over another,
he has also argued that religious groups can receive
public funds if the program is "neutral" toward
religion. For example, if a state gives "vouchers" to
children to enroll in private schools, that money could
be used for parochial schools.
Thursday's 5-4 ruling in Rosenberger vs.
University of Virginia marked the first time the court
upheld the use of state funds to promote religious
expression, in this case a student magazine that
espoused "a Christian perspective" on contemporary
life.
Not surprisingly, religious-rights advocates were
delighted. The ruling finally "repudiates the popular
misconception that treating religious groups equally
violates" the First Amendment, said Steven
McFarland, a lawyer for the Christian Legal Society.
In its term-end summary, People for the American
Way faulted the court for "chipping away at the
separation of church and state."
For his part, the chiefjustice did not stay around
Washington to hear the applause or the criticism. As
usual, he goes his own way.
On the last day of the term, he headed off to
Britain to teach at Cambridge University. A fan of the
World War I poet Rupert Brooke, Rehnquist says he
will be taking the time to "explore some of his old
haunts" around the ancient university town.
LINEUP ON KEY DECISIONS
How the nine justices voted on seven of the
biggest decisions of the term:
Issue: Affirmative action
William Rehnquist: Sided with majority
John Paul Stevens: Sided with dissent*
Sandra Day O'Connor: Sided with majority *
Antonin Scalia: Sided with majority
Anthony Kennedy: Sided with majority
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David Souter: Sided with dissent
Clarence Thomas: Sided with majority
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Sided with dissent
Stephen Breyer: Sided with dissent
Issue: School desegregation
William Rehnquist: Sided with majority*
John Paul Stevens: Sided with dissent
Sandra Day O'Connor: Sided with majority
Antonin Scalia: Sided with majority
Anthony Kennedy: Sided with majority
David Souter: Sided with dissent*
Clarence Thomas: Sided with majority
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Sided with dissent
Stephen Breyer: Sided with dissent
Issue: Endangered species
William Rehnquist: Sided with dissent
John Paul Stevens: Sided with majority *
Sandra Day O'Connor: Sided with majority
Antonin Scalia: Sided with dissent*
Anthony Kennedy: Sided with majority
David Souter: Sided with majority
Clarence Thomas: Sided with dissent
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Sided with majority
Stephen Breyer: Sided with majority
Issue: Limiting Congress' power
William Rehnquist: Sided with majority *
John Paul Stevens: Sided with dissent
Sandra Day O'Connor: Sided with majority
Antonin Scalia: Sided with majority
Anthony Kennedy: Sided with majority
David Souter: Sided with dissent
Clarence Thomas: Sided with majority
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Sided with dissent
Stephen Breyer: Sided with dissent*
Issue: Racial gerrymandering
William Rehnquist: Sided with majority
John Paul Stevens: Sided with dissent
Sandra Day O'Connor: Sided with majority
Antonin Scalia: Sided with maiority
Anthony Kennedy: Sided with majority*
David Souter: Sided with dissent
Clarence Thomas: Sided with majority
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Sided with dissent*
Stephen Breyer: Sided with dissent
Issue: Term limits
William Rehnquist: Sided with dissent
John Paul Stevens: Sided with majority *
Sandra Day O'Connor: Sided with dissent
Antonin Scalia: Sided with dissent
Anthony Kennedy: Sided with majority
David Souter: Sided with majority
Clarence Thomas: Sided with dissent*
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Sided with majority
Stephen Breyer: Sided with majority
Issue: Religion
William Rehnquist: Sided with majority
John Paul Stevens: Sided with dissent
Sandra Day O'Connor: Sided with majority
Antonin Scalia: Sided with majority
Anthony Kennedy: Sided with majority*
David Souter: Sided with dissent*
Clarence Thomas: Sided with majority
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Sided with dissent
Stephen Breyer: Sided with dissent
* Indicates author of opinion. Both sides, majority
and dissent, issue written opinions.
Source: The Times Washington Bureau
MAJOR DECISIONS
This term, the Supreme Court decided that:
FIRST AMENDMENT
* Child pornography law is constitutional because
it requires that sellers know if actors ere minors. (U.S.
vs. X-Citement Video)
* Congress violated the free-speech rights of
federal workers by barring them from making money
writing articles or giving speeches in their spare time.
(U.S. vs. NTEU)
* People have a free-speech right to pass out
anonymous leaflets on political topics. (McIntyre vs.
Ohio)
* State bars may keep lawyers from sending
solicitations to accident victims for 30 days. (Florida
Bar vs. Went for It Inc.)
* Private sponsors of a parade cannot be forced to
include marchers, such as gays and lesbians, whose
message conflicts with theirs. (Hurley vs. Irish
American Gays)
* A state university may not refuse to subsidize a
student magazine simply because it offers a Christian
perspective. (Rosenberger vs. University of Virginia)
* State officials may not exclude the display of a
cross in a public park if they permit other symbols.
(Capitol Square vs. Pinette)
FEDERAL VS. STATE
* Congress exceeded its power by passing a law
that makes it a crime to have a gun near a school.
(Lopez vs. U.S.)
* States may not limit the terms of members of
Congress. (U.S. Term Limits vs. Thornton)
* States can revoke the right to annual parole
hearings for long-term inmates. (California vs.
Morales)
* States may limit welfare benefits for large
households. (Anderson vs. Edwards)
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* Congress intended to protect the habitat of
animals on the verge of extinction when it passed the
Endangered Species Act. (Babbitt vs. Sweet Home
Chapter)
CIVIL RIGHTS
* Federal programs that set "racial classifications"
for awarding contracts or jobs are generally
unconstitutional. (Adarand vs. Pena)
* A federal judge in Kansas City exceeded his
power by ordering costly upgrades in the quality of the
city schools as part of a desegregation plan. (Missouri
vs. Jenkins)
* Employers cannot block job discrimination
lawsuits by dredging up old evidence that shows the
worker violated some job rules. (McKennon vs.
Nashville Banner)
* Electoral districts are unconstitutional if race
was the "predominant factor" in their design. (Miller
vs. Johnson)
* Cities may not zone out group homes for
alcoholics and former drug abusers. (Edmonds vs.
Oxford House)
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
* The exclusionary rule does not demand the
suppression of evidence found when police, because
of a computer error, wrongly arrested a suspect.
(Arizona vs. Evans)
* The Fourth Amendment does not bar school
officials from forcing students to undergo regular drug
tests. (Vernonia vs. Acton)
* Judges should generally dismiss lawsuits filed
by prisoners who say their rights were violated by
extra punishments imposed on them. (Sandin vs.
Conner)
* Prison inmates who cite new evidence that
would likely convince a reasonable juror that they are
innocent deserve another chance to appeal in federal
court. (Schlup vs. Missouri)
* The federal law against false statements applies
only to the executive branch and does not cover lies
told to Congress or in judicial proceedings. (Hubbard
vs. U.S.)
* The Fourth Amendment usually requires police
with a search warrant to "knock and announce" their
presence before they enter a residence. (Wilson vs.
Arkansas)
* An official who discloses the existence of a
wiretap violates the law, even if the tap has expired.
(U.S. vs. Aguilar)
Source: The Times Washington Bureau
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FAREWELL TO THE OLD ORDER IN THE COURT
The New York Times
Copyright 1995 The New York Times Company
July 2, 1995, Sunday
Linda Greenhouse
Washington - The birth struggle of a new era is not
a pretty sight. It is messy, it is unstable, it is riveting.
It was the Supreme Court during the 1994-95 term
that ended on Thursday.
An ascendant bloc of three conservative Justices
with an appetite for fundamental, even radical change
drove the Court on a re-examination of basic
Constitutional principles. Long-held assumptions
about the authority of the national government, the
relationship between Washington and the states, and
the ability of the Federal Government to take race into
account in making public policy were all placed on the
table for dissection. Some precedents were overruled,
others sharply limited in a gaudy show of zero-based
jurisprudence.
These three Justices - Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist along with Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas -- could usually count on Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy to join them, and in nearly all
the term's most important contested cases had the
support of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor as well.
When their reach exceeded their grasp, in fact, it
was usually not because they lacked the five votes
needed to make a majority but because the fifth vote,
Justice O'Connor's, carried with it a note of
equivocation or compromise that muddied the
message of the other four.
On the term's final day, for example, Justice
O'Connor wrote separately to explain her votes
concurring with Justice Kennedy's majority opinions
in two 5-to-4 decisions.
One was a decision invalidating a majority-black
congressional district in Georgia as an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander, and the other
required the University of Virginia to subsidize an
on-campus student religious magazine on the same
basis as other student publications. In both instances,
the wary tone of Justice O'Connor's separate opinions
raised substantial questions about whether the
definitively stated conclusions in the majority
opinions, which she also signed, could actually be
taken at face value.
The center all but disappeared from the Court this
term. That was surprising, given the arrival of
President Clinton's two nominees, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, both pragmatic
moderates who easily won confirmation with strong
bipartisan support and who were widely expected to
help anchor a strong central bloc.
But there turned out to be virtually no center for
-these two experienced Federal judges to anchor. They
joined a Court that, far from converging toward the
center, was driven by competing visions of the
Constitution and the country. Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer have clearly staked their ground on one side of
the divide along with John Paul Stevens, the
75-year-old senior Associate Justice, and David H.
Souter, the New Hampshire Republican whose
emergence as a liberal within the Court's current
spectrum is one of the more interesting developments
of the last few years.
The old labels have little relevance on the Court
today. There is no liberal in the mold of Justices
Thurgood Marshall and William J. Brennan Jr., who
both retired in the early 1990's and who sought to use
the Court as an engine of social change.
The current bloc of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Stevens and Souter might more properly be called
conservatives. They are the ones now arguing for
adherence to precedent, as for example in their votes
dissenting from Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, which held that
Federal affirmative action programs are
unconstitutional unless they can survive the most
rigorous judicial scrutiny. That decision overturned a
1990 opinion of Justice Brennan's that had given the
Federal Government more leeway to devise programs
designed to benefit members of racial minorities.
And it is this group of Justices who now argue on
behalf of that one time conservative shibboleth,judicial restraint, and against reaching out to decide
cases that are, arguably, not properly before the Court.
Justice Souter made that argument in dissent from
Chief Justice Rehnquist's 5-to-4 opinion in a case
from Kansas City, Mo., that curbed judicial oversight
of long-running school desegregation programs.
Justice Stevens argued, also in dissent, that the white
voters who challenged the majority-black Georgia
congressional district had suffered no harm and should
not have been accorded standing to bring the case.
By the same token, judicial activism, a phrase that
conservatives once hurled as an epithet, easily fits
Chief Justice Rehnquist's 5-to-4 majority opinion
striking down a Federal law that made it a crime to
carry a gun near a school. It was the first time in 60
years that the Court had invalidated a Federal law on
the ground that Congress had exceeded its
constitutional authority to regulate interstate
commerce.
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A deep skepticism about Federal power was a
theme that ran through the term.The decision on the
gun law, United States v. Lopez, was only one
example. Another was the 5-to-4 decision that rejected
state-imposed term limits for members of Congress.
The dissenters -- Justice Thomas joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and O'Connor --
argued for a vision of federalism in which the Federal
Government operates essentially at the sufferance of
the sovereign states.
The term's two most important rulings about race,
Justice O'Connor's affirmative action decision and
Justice Kennedy's opinion in the redistricting case,
rejected the Court's long-held view that the
Government has a special institutional role in
addressing racial discrimination. Justice Kennedy's
opinion said it would be "inappropriate" for the Court
to "accord deference" to the Justice Department's view
of its mandate to enforce the Voting Rights Act.
The Court declared four Federal laws
unconstitutional during the term, an unusually high
number given that the Court had invalidated only 129
laws in its previous 205-year history. In addition to
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, the Court
struck down two laws on First Amendment grounds:
a 1935 law that prohibited beer labels from displaying
alcohol content and a 1989 Federal ethics law that
prohibited Federal civil servants from accepting
money for extracurricular writing and speaking. The
Court also overturned, on separation-of-powers
grounds, a 1991 law that revived a group of securities
lawsuits.
During the term that began last Oct. 3 and ended
June 29, the Court issued opinions in only 82 cases.
That was the lowest number since the 82 opinions
issued during the 1955-56 term. In the early 1980's,
the Court was deciding nearly twice the number of
cases.
Thirty-five of the cases this term, or 43 percent,
were decided by 9-to-0 votes. One of the most notable
was Justice Souter's opinion that the organizers of the
Boston St. Patrick's Day parade could not be required
by state law to include marchers seeking to identify
themselves as gay and lesbian.
Sixteen of the cases, or 20 percent, were decided
by 5-to-4 votes, and these were often the ideological
battlegrounds. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, whose
participation was usually the key to victory in these
cases, were in the majority more than any other
Justice: 13 out of the 16 cases for Justice Kennedy and
11 cases for Justice O'Connor. The
Stevens-Souter-Ginsburg- Breyer group voted together
10 times in these cases: four times in the majority,
when they gained the support of either Justice
Kennedy or Justice O'Connor, and six times in
dissent.
Taking as a rough measure of the Court's
ideological polarities the 35 cases in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens were on
opposite sides, the alliances of the other Justices were
as follows: Justice Thomas, 33 times with the Chief
Justice and twice with Justice Stevens; Justice Scalia,
31 times with the Chief Justices and four times with
Justice Stevens; Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, both
24 times with the Chief Justice and 10 times with
Justice Stevens; Justice Breyer, 16 times with the
Chief Justice and 18 times with Justice Stevens;
Justice Souter, 14 times with the Chief Justice and 20
times with Justice Stevens; and Justice Ginsburg, 11
times with the Chief Justice and 23 times with Justice
Stevens. (Not all Justices voted in all the cases).
Justices Thomas and Scalia voted often together,
40 times in 46 non-unanimous cases, and so did
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer: 36 of the 45
non-unanimous cases in which both voted.
The Court's struggle resumes Oct. 2, when the
Justices will confront old battles -- further redistricting
cases -- and new, most notably, a Colorado case on
whether voters can prohibit the adoption of measures
to protect homosexuals against discrimination.
Below, summaries of the term's major rulings.
FEDERAL POWERS: REVOKING GUN-FREE
ZONES AND TERM LIMITS
One of the Court's most striking departures was
the invalidation, for the first time in 60 years, of a
Federal law on the ground that Congress had exceeded
its constitutional authority to regulate interstate
commerce. The 5-to-4 decision in U.S. v. Lopez, No.
93-1260, struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990, which made it a crime to carry a gun within
1,000 feet of a school. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion said that the law had "nothing to do
with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise,"
instead amounted to a Federal intrusion on the states'
general police powers.
This bitterly contested decision left open the
question of how the Court intends to apply its newly
limited view of Federal authority, and how
aggressively it intends to police the Federal-state
border. The dissenters were Justices Souter, Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer.
The Court's ruling in the term-limits case a month
later made clear that the Court is engaged in a
profound debate over the nature and sources of
legitimacy of the national Government. By a 5-to-4
margin, the Court ruled that in the absence of a
constitutional amendment, states may not limit the
number of terms that members of Congress may serve.
The decision, U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, No.
93-1456, had the effect of wiping off the books
term-limits measures that 23 states had adopted for
their congressional delegations.
The debate within the Court was over the
meaning of national citizenship and over state
autonomy within the Federal system. Writing for the
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majority, Justice Stevens said members of Congress
"occupy offices that are integral and essential
components of a single national Government," the
requirements for which are set out on the Constitution
and cannot be further restricted by the states. The
majority was composed of the dissenters in the Lopez
case with the addition of Justice Kennedy, a member
of the Lopez majority.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas said
that the individual states, rather than the
"undifferentiated people of the national as a whole,"
remained the source of the Federal Government's
authority and, as such, retained the right to add further
qualifications to membership in Congress.
The Court also issued one of its infrequent
opinions on the constitutional separation of powers. It
ruled that Congress stepped impermissibly out of its
legislative role by passing a 1991 law that directed
Federal courts to reopen a group of securities lawsuits
that a Supreme Court decision had effectively killed
six months earlier. Congress may not exercise judicial
power, Justice Scalia said for the Court in striking
down the provision, an amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act. The vote in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
No. 93-1121, was 7 to 2, with Justices Ginsburg and
Stevens dissenting.
In its most important ruling of the term on the
validity of a Government regulation, the Court upheld
the Interior Department's broad view of its authority
to protect the habitat of endangered species on
privately owned land. Justice Stevens wrote the 6-to-3
decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home, No. 94-859. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented.
DISCRIMINATION: A STRICTER STANDARD
FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The Court ruled, 5 to 4, that the Federal
Government's affirmative action programs must be
able to meet the same strict constitutional review to
which the Court had already subjected state and local
programis that classify people by race. The decision,
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, No. 93-1841, will
inevitably curtail programs designed to convey special
Federal benefits to members of minority groups, but is
unlikely to end such programs entirely. In her majority
opinion, Justice O'Connor noted the country's legacy
of racial discrimination and said "the Government is
not disqualified from acting in response to it."
The ruling, in a challenge brought by a white
contractor to a minority-preference provision in a
Federal highway construction program, was based on
the Court's understanding of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. The Constitution
protects "persons, not groups," Justice O'Connor said.
The dissenters were Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer.
On the same day and with the same division on
the Court, the Justices ruled that the lower Federal
courts in Missouri had improperly ordered the state to
help pay for a showcase desegregation plan for the
Kansas City schools. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion, Missouri v. Jenkins, No. 93-1823,
cast doubt on the continued viability of the plan,
which features magnet schools intended in part to lure
students from the surrounding, mostly white suburbs.
The decision also underscored the majority's
impatience with continued Federal court involvement
in school desegregation.
The Court injected further turmoil into the already
unsettled redistricting picture with its final day, 5-to-4
ruling that the use of race as a "predominant factor" in
drawing district lines makes the districts
presumptively unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy's
majority decision, Miller v. Johnson, No. 94-631,
invalidated a Georgia's 11th Congressional district,
drawn by the state legislature at the Justice
Department's prodding to provide a third
majority-black district for the state. The 14th
Amendment's equal protection guarantee does not
permit the state to separate citizens into districts on
the basis of race without compelling justification,
Justice Kennedy said.
At the same time, the Court agreed to review two
new cases involving majority-black districts in North
Carolina and Texas, an action that made clear that the
Court is still in the midst of grappling with the issue.
The dissenters in the Georgia case were Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer.
In an important job discrimination case, the Court
ruled unanimously that employees who lose their jobs
because of discrimination are still entitled to back pay,
even if the employer later discovers misconduct that
would have justified dismissal had it been known at
the time. Justice Kennedy's opinion, McKennon v.
Nashville Banner, No. 93-1543, rejected an
increasingly popular defense tool in job discrimination
cases known as "after-acquired evidence." A growing
number of lower Federal courts had ruled that
employers could establish a complete defense to a
discrimination claim if they learned, often belatedly
through pre-trial discovery, that they employee had
exaggerated a resume or committed some other
infraction that would have merited dismissal.
RELIGION: SEPARATION OF CHURCH, STATE
AND MESSAGE
Two religion cases opened the door to greater
government accommodation of religious speech in the
public marketplace. The Court ruled, 5 to 4, that the
University of Virginia must provide a financial
subsidy to a student religious publication on the same
basis as other student publications. Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion rejected the university's argument
that discrimination against religious speech was
required to maintain the separation between church
and state. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer dissented in Rosenberger v. University of
Virginia, No. 94-329.
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The Court ruled that the Ku Klux Klan had a
free-speech right to erect across in a state park in
Columbus, Ohio, finding on a 7-to-2 vote that the
state could not exclude the Klan's religious message
from a public forum that was open to other private
speakers. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in Capitol
Square Review Board v. Pinette, No. 94-780.
SPEECH: NO RAINING ON SOMEBODY'S
PRIVATE PARADE
The Court ruled unanimously that the private
sponsors of Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade have a
constitutional right to exclude marchers who seek to
identify themselves as gay. A parade is a form of
private expression, albeit in a public place, that may
not be forced by the government to carry an unwanted
message, Justice Souter said in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, No. 94-749.
In an important ruling on the free speech rights of
public employees, the Court struck down a Federal
law that barred Federal civil servants from accepting
pay for speeches and articles, even for those without
any connection to their public jobs. Justice Stevens
wrote the 6-to-3 opinion in U.S. v. National Treasury
Employees Union, No. 93-1170. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
The Court ruled that the First Amendment
protects the right to distribute anonymous campaign
literature. The 7-to-2 decision, with a majority opinion
by Justice Stevens and dissenting votes from Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, raised questions
about the validity of election laws in most states,
which requires people who put out campaign literature
or political advertisements to identify themselves.
"Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the
majority," Justice Stevens wrote in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, No. 93-986.
The Court veered sharply from its precedents
protecting the constitutional right of lawyers to
advertise. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court upheld a
Fiorida rule that lawyers must wait at least 30 days
after an accident before writing to solicit the victim's
business. Justice O'Connor's opinion, Florida Bar v.
Went for It, Inc., No. 94-226, said the rule served the
valid purpose of protecting accident victims' privacy
and the bar's reputation. She was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and by Justices Scalia, Thomas and
Breyer.
CRIMINAL LAW: FREEING PUBLIC SCHOOLS
TO TEST FOR DRUG USE
The question of whether public schools can
require student athletes to submit to random
drug-testing did not reach the Court as a criminal case,
but it did require the Justices to interpret the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure, a provision common to many criminal
cases on the docket.
The Court ruled, 6 to 3, that testing of student
athletes was reasonable, leaving open the question of
whether other students might also be tested. Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion, Vernonia School District v.
Acton, No. 94-590; Justices O'Connor, Stevens and
Souter dissented.
In an important prison ruling, the Court made it
substantially more difficult for inmates to bring
constitutional lawsuits, under the 14th Amendment's
guarantee of due process, to challenge actions by
prison officials.
This 5-to-4 decision, Sandin v. Conner, No.
93-1911, was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
has long sought to curb Federal court involvement in
state prison affairs. While not directly overruling any
precedents, the decision repudiated an analysis that the
court has used in its recent prisoners' rights cases
under which prisoners could establish the right to be
free of various types of restrictions, unless particular
prison policies are followed. The dissenters were
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens and Souter.
Resolving a decades-old constitutional debate, the
Court ruled unanimously that the police are ordinarily
required to knock and announce their presence before
entering a house to execute a search warrant. But there
may be "reasonable" exceptions to the rule to account
for a likelihood of violence or imminent destruction of
evidence, Justice Thomas said in his opinion for the
Court, Wilson v. Arkansas, No. 94-5707.
The Court ventured for the first time into the
world of computerized law enforcement. The Justices
ruled, 7 to 2, that evidence seized by police on the
basis of an erroneous computer report of a valid
warrant could be used in court, as long as the error
was made by a court employee and not by a law
enforcement official. Three members of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion -- Justices O'Connor,
Souter and Breyer - saw dangers ahead in this area
and suggested that the police would be held
accountable for their own errors in a future case. This
case was Arizona v. Evans, No. 93-1660.
The Court salvaged the Federal law against child
pornography by editing it to make clear that the
Government must prove that a defendant knew that the
performers in sexually explicit photographs or films
were under the age of 18.
The poorly drafted Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act makes it a crime to distribute
or receive "knowingly" a sexually explicit "visual
depiction" of a child. The question was whether the
Court should hold Congress to what it said, which
could make it a crime for an innocent person to send
or receive an unidentified package that later turned out
to contain child pornography, or whether to read the
law as Congress evidently meant to write it and to
require the Government to prove that a defendant
knew that a performer was under age. In U.S. v.
X-Citement Video, No. 93-723, the vote was 7 to 2 to
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modify the law's clumsy construction, with Justices
Scalia and Thomas objecting to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's editorial efforts.
The Federal sentencing guidelines instruct judges
to consider all "relevant conduct" in setting the
sentence. Since sentences in narcotics cases depend on
the weight of the illegal drugs, evidence of other drug
transactions that the Government has not yet taken to
trial can be used to boost a sentence and, under this
ruling, can then be used as the basis for a separate
prosecution. Justice O'Connor wrote the 8-to-1
opinion, Witte v. U.S., No. 94-6187, with Justice
Stevens the lone dissenter.
In an important ruling on the obligation of
Federal judges to review state prisoners' petitions for
writs of habeas corpus, the Court ruled that a judge
who is in "grave doubt" about whether a constitutional
error affected the outcome of the state-court trial
should assume that it did and must order a new trial.
Justice Breyer wrote the 6-to-3 majority opinion,
O'Neal v. McAninch, No. 93-7407; Justices Thomas
and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
The Court ruled in favor of state death-row
inmates in two other habeas corpus cases, both by the
same 5-to-4 lineup with the majority comprised of
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer. In one case, Schlup v. Delo, No. 93-7901, the
Court gave a Missouri death row inmate, Lloyd
Schlup, a second chance to persuade the lower Federal
courts that his execution would be a "miscarriage of
justice." The majority opinion by Justice Stevens said
the lower Federal courts had set too exacting a
standard for Mr. Schlup to meet before being allowed
to present evidence -- a prison videotape - that he
says shows he could not have been at the scene of a
cell-block murder.
In the second case, Kyles v. Whitley, No.
93-7927, the Court ordered a new trial for a
condemned Louisiana murderer, Curtis Lee Kyles, on
the ground that the prosecution had withheld
important evidence favorable to the defense.
BUSINESS, TAXES: FREQUENT FLIER
CONTRACT GETS CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF
The term's most important consumer case
permitted members of airline frequent-flier plans, in
this case the AAdvantage program of American
Airlines, to sue an airline in state court for breach of
contract over retroactive changes in frequent flier
benefits. Justice Ginsburg's opinion, American
Airlines v. Wolens, No. 93-1286, rejected the
argument that the lawsuit was preempted by Federal
law. The vote was 6 to 2, with Justices O'Connor and
Thomas dissenting and Justice Scalia not
participating.
The Court settled an old dispute in trademark law
by ruling unanimously that color can be registered as
a trademark when it distinguishes a particular product
and serves no other function. Justice Breyer wrote the
opinion, Qualitex v. Jacobson Products, No. 93-1577.
In a major victory for banks in their competition
with the insurance industry, the Court unanimously
upheld the Comptroller of the Currency's policy of
permitting national banks to sell annuities. Justice
Ginsburg's opinion, Nationsbank of North Carolina v.
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., No. 93-1612,
strongly endorsed the Comptroller's regulatory
authority.
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Reagan Appointees Lead Move Rightward
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This is the Supreme Court that Ronald Reagan
wanted but didn't get.
Reagan, when he was president, opposed
affirmative action and argued against redrawing
voting districts to ensure the election of minorities. He
sought a lower wall of separation between church and
state and thought Washington had usurped some of
the states' power.
This term the court -- led by a core of Reagan
appointees -- finally delivered.
"It has been one of the finest terms in
generations," said Clint Bolick, a former Reagan
Justice Department lawyer and now litigation director
at the Institute for Justice. "What is especially bright
from our perspective is the cohesiveness of the
five-member majority."
The same five justices -- Chief William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas -- voted together in the biggest, most
controversial cases of the term. Reagan elevated
Rehnquist to chief in 1986 and appointed O'Connor,
Scalia and Kennedy. Thomas was put on the court by
George Bush.
As a bloc, the five justices struck down a "black
majority" voting district, set in motion a rollback of
federal affirmative action programs and rejected a
Kansas City school desegregation plan. Their message
to the nation: It is time to put race aside.
They also alloedvv fUo Lat Ais time Ver -9mLt
fiinding of a religious activity, a student-run Christian
journal at the University of Virginia. And in striking
down a congressional ban on guns near local schools,
the majority signaled its distaste for federal
intervention in state and local affairs.
All told, this term marked the first time in the
post-Warren era that five conservatives held together
and spoke boldly on a range of constitutional
questions. "What we're seeing is the payoff from the
Reagan-Bush years," said Georgetown University law
professor David Cole. "It is a 1980s court,
politically."
"They have taken a sharp turn to the right on race
and religion," agreed Stanford University law
professor Kathleen Sullivan. But, she added, at least
in terms of limiting congressional power, "their bark
is probably worse than their bite."
The change was abrupt. The early 1990s, with the
same five conservative justices in place, were marked
by sleepy terms, with the court for the most part
refraining from bold initiatives. In the most fractious
conflicts, on abortion and school prayer, O'Connor
and Kennedy voted in ways that ensured the court did
not measurably move the law.
Now a plain fault line exists, with John Paul
Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer on the left, and often on the losing
side. The court has revved up the nation's social policy
agenda, particularly on race, and the overriding
question as the court finished its term Thursday was:
Why this boldness now?
One answer may lie in O'Connor, in recent years
a moderate influence but this term largely in the
conservative camp.
"Maybe in the immediate aftermath of [William
J.] Brennan's and [Thurgood] Marshall's departures,
O'Connor wanted to provide some of the ballast on the
court," said Yale University law professor Paul
Gewirtz.
With Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
voting together and representing a liberal wing,
Gewirtz observed, "it may have released her sense of
being a balance wheel."
At the same time, court experts noted that
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas -- the core
conservatives - were speaking with stronger, clearer
voices this term on the proper balance of state and
national powers and on the Constitution's prohibition,
in their view, of government's use of race
classifications, even to right past wrongs.
Thomas, the court's only black justice, has been
particularly energized.
"Government cannot make us equal," Thomas
wrote in the affirmative action case, Adarand v. Pena,
"it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal
before the law. . . [G]overnment-sponsored racial
discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as
noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious
prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination,
plain and simple."
When the court struck down a federal judge's
school desegregation plan for Kansas City, Mo.,
Thomas wrote, "It never ceases to amaze me that the
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courts are so willing to assume that anything that is
predominantly black must be inferior."
O'Connor, and to a greater degree Kennedy, have
long been troubled by government classifications
based on race. As a result, this term's cases played to
these key justices's conservative sides.
When Kennedy wrote the Miller v. Johnson
opinion last week striking down a Georgia
redistricting plan, he adopted earlier words from
O'Connor about affirmative action: Racial
classifications "embody stereotypes that treat
individuals as the product of their race, evaluating
their thoughts and efforts - their very worth as
citizens -- according to a criterion barred to the
government by history and the Constitution."
Bolick noted that other government officials and
the country as a whole have a "greater sense of
urgency" now to resolve old dilemmas of race. Even
before the court reviewed a federal contracting
program that favored firms owned by racial minorities,
members of the new Republican Congress called for
an end to policies that give special advantage to racial
minorities.
Donald B. Ayer, a former Reagan administration
lawyer who was a law clerk to Rehnquist, said the
court's "straightforward" view of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws was its
boldest stroke this term.
"At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection lies the simple command that the
government must treat citizens as individuals, not as
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or
national class," the majority said.
Ayer, who became a deputy attorney general in
the Bush administration and is now in private
practice, said the court's resistance to race-conscious
decision-making "raises an interesting issue of where
America is now and to what degree race is a real-life
consideration."
In other worUds, are PumIerilans ready lur Ue
"colorblind" ideal the majority seeks? "If the law
chooses to almost completely read it out of relevancy,"
Ayer said, "then you have to watch how . .. the law
and society" keep up with each other.
Civil rights leaders respond that in this case the
law -- or at least the court -- is out of touch with
society.
"There is a strong argument that this court is at
war with minority rights," asserted Frank R. Parker, a
professor at the District of Columbia School of Law.
"The court's decisions are seriously damaging
minorities' ability to gain equality in the economic and
political life of the country."
Still, the real impact of the rulings is uncertain.
Sullivan referred to the court's 1978 ruling
rejecting racial quotas in school admissions but
allowing some consideration of an applicant's race, in
University of California Regents v. Bakke.
"Just as the Bakke struck down quotas and left
the door open for some [race] preferences, Adarand
leaves the door slightly ajar for affirmative action and
Miller leaves the door slightly open" for use of
"majority minority" voting districts, Sullivan said.
O'Connor wrote in Adarand v. Pena that the
court's new standard for federal affirmative action
need not be "fatal" to such programs. But she did not
make clear what could justify them, beyond possible
evidence of "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate
discriminatory conduct" by government against blacks
or other minorities.
In the voting rights case, O'Connor said in a
concurring statement that the new standard for the
constitutionality of "majority minority" voting districts
"does not throw into doubt the vast majority of the
nation's 435 congressional districts." She said race
still can be a consideration in redistricting, as long as
the state has not "relied on race in substantial
disregard of customary and traditional districting
practices."
The standard the court used for Georgia's black
majority district and the federal affirmative action plan
is known as judicial "strict scrutiny." That means, to
pass constitutional muster, government must prove
that it had a "compelling interest" in adopting a
race-based program and that the program or policy
was "narrowly tailored" to that compelling interest.
Left for lower courts and eventual high court
review is what sort of evidence of past discrimination
and racial remedies will pass that test, if any. Clinton
administration officials have said that although the
hurdle is high, it is not insurmountable.
But Scalia wrote that nothing can justify
affirmative action: "[Under our Constitution there can
be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race."
Scalia's sentiment recalls Reagan's admonition in
1986, a few moniuhs ufore h iominated Scalia tU tl
high court: "We want a colorblind society. The ideal
will be when we have achieved the moment when
nothing is done to or for anyone because of race ...
but in spite of' the person's race.
1994-1995 SUPREME COURT HIGHLIGHTS
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Adarand v. Pena, 5-4. Federal programs designed to
benefit minorities are unconstitutional unless they
serve a compelling government interest and are
narrowly tailored to address past bias.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 5-4. A federal judge may not try
to integrate a city's school system by ordering extra
spending to attract suburban students; desegregation
remedies should be tailored to a district.
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Miller v. Johnson, 5-4. A judge should strictly
scrutinize a redistricting map when legislatures have
used race as a predominant factor in drawing
boundaries, to ensure that equal protection rights are
not violated.
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 6-3. Cities may
not use zoning ordinances to exclude group homes for
recovering alcoholics or other disabled people from
residential neighborhoods.
McKennon v. Nashville Banner, 9-0. A worker who
sues for job discrimination still has a case even if the
employer discovers in preparing for the case that the
worker lied to get hired.
STUDENT DRUG TESTING
Veronia School District 47J v. Acton, 6-3. A school
district may require that all students take drug tests as
a condition of playing sports, without violating
privacy rights.
GOVERNMENT POWER
U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton, 5-4. States cannot
set term limits for members of Congress, because the
Constitution lists the exclusive qualifications, relating
to age, citizenship and residency.
United States v. Lopez, 5-4. Congress exceeded its
authority to intervene in local affairs when it passed a
law intended to keep firearms out of schoolyards. For
the first time in 60 years, the court limited Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce.
ENVIRONMENT
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 6-3. Federal
regulators may stop private landowners from
developing their property in ways that could destroy
the habitat of endangered wildlife species.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of
Virginia, 5-4. The university violated the speech
rights of a student group by refusing to provide funds
for its Christian magazine whiie subsidizing
nonreligious publications.
Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 7-2. Ohio was
wrong to bar the Ku Klux Klan from putting up a
large wooden cross in front of the Capitol. The court
said a privately sponsored cross in a public forum
does not breach the constitutional requirement for
separation of church and state.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 9-0. The organizers of Boston's St.
Patrick's Day parade should have been allowed to
exclude gay marchers because a parade is a form of
expression.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 7-2. States
cannot ban anonymous leafleting.
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,
6-3. A law that bars executive branch workers from
earning outside income from speeches and articles
even when they are unrelated to their work is
unconstitutional.
Florida Bar Association v. Went For It Inc., 5-4. A
state may forbid lawyers from soliciting accident
victims and their relatives within 30 days of an
accident.
CRIMINAL LAW
Arizona v. Evans, 7-2. When a person is wrongly
arrested based on a computer error, illegal drugs or
any other evidence police fortuitously find on the
individual need not be suppressed at trial.
Wilson v. Arkansas, 9-0. Police generally must knock
and announce themselves before entering a home with
a valid search warrant.
Schlup v. Delo, 5-4. A state prisoner who says he has
new evidence of innocence should get a federal
hearing if he shows that a reasonable juror would have
found him not guilty based on that evidence.
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WASHINGTON GETS AMENDMENT FEVER
The 'New Federalism' Has Congress and the Supreme Court Debating First
Principles
Copyright 1995
The National Law Journal
by the New York Law Publishing Company
Monday, June 5, 1995
Marcia Coyle
National Law Journal Staff-Reporter
Washington-In the bubbling bouillabai'sse of
federal lawmaking, the Republican-controlled
Congress is mixing ingredients that could alter in the
next 100 days fundamental relationships set out in the
nation's charter, the U.S. Constitution.
Whether this untested recipe results in a palatable
specialty or a dicey potluck stew, say constitutional
scholars and historians, is too difficult to predict. But
there is agreement, within vast areas of disagreement
among those who study the founding charter, that the
nation is firmly embarked on one of its periodic and
great constitutional journeys.
Even as Congress wrestles to redefine the federal
government's role in relation to the states and its role
in relation to the other branches, the U.S. Supreme
Court is drawing constitutional lines of its own. Two
recent and remarkable decisions-one involving
state-imposed congressional term limits and the other,
federally imposed restrictions on guns near
schools-reflect the high court's vision of the
responsibilities outlined in the Constitution. Its
members are as sharply divided as are the lawmakers
debating across the street on Capitol Hill.
And the American people, who last November
sent a strong message of discontent with the federal
government, may be re-evaluating their attitudes in the
wake of the Oklahoma bombing. The disaster
humanized a faceless bureaucracy and exposed, as
never before, the deadly extreme of anti-government
Sentiment.-,
"I think what we've got is a very vibrant national
discourse going on which, more than we saw in the
'80s, is involving all the federal players as well as the
states," says Prof. Michael J. Gerhardt of the College
of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
From now until the end of the year, the
constitutional framework may be stretched, shrunk or
dramatically changed in basically three ways:
-- By direct amendment through congressional
action and state ratification- witness the arrival of the
religious right's social-moral agenda, which includes
school prayer, abortion and other proposals.
- By legislative initiatives, such as the line-item
veto and foreign policy changes, that affect the
allocation of power among the federal branches.
-- By so-called devolution, such as welfare and
regulatory reform, which shifts large blocks of federal
responsibilities to the states.
From a historian's perspective, much of the
federalism debate on Capitol Hill is "very creaky
stuff," says Prof. R.B. Bernstein of New York Law
School, author of "Amending America" and other
books on American constitutional history. But, he
adds, this year, unlike in similar periods in the
Constitution's life, something is "qualitatively
different" about the degree of commitment to rewriting
the rules from the ground up.
'COMPOUND REPUBLIC'
"We're seeing the most remarkable shift in public
thinking about government and where governmental
responsibilities should be placed since FDR," says
Professor Bernstein. "If may be the most remarkable
shift because we're seeing it throughout the culture;
we're hearing it everywhere."
The Constitution can be "changed" in basically
three ways: through Art. 5, by adding provisions in a
demanding amendment process; through judicial
interpretation; and by custom and usage (for example,
the recognition of executive privilege). Today,
political scientists also talk about devolution, a
reordering and shifting of federal responsibilities, in
a debate over who should do what and who gets what
that implicates fundamental questions about
federalism.
The federalism debate is literally as old as the
Republic itself, or the "compound republic," as James
Madison described it in the Federalist Papers. And it's
unlikely to be resolved because, as Woodrow Wilson
said, "It is a question of growth, and every successive
stage of our political and economic development gives
it a new aspect, makes it a new question."
During the presidential campaign and first term of
Richard M. Nixon, says Professor Bernstein, the seeds
emerged of what some called the new federalism- the
shifting of federal responsibilities to the states.
"That theme has been with us ever since," he
explains. "Substantively, this has always been
extraordinarily important, but now the people are
starting to get it. They also are reacting in almost
unthinking revulsion against the federal government."
Previously unassailable incumbents were falling in
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elections; it was easier than ever to run against the
government. Even the popular culture reflected these
sentiments, he says; for example, the hit television
show "The X-Files" conveys the message that the
government is bad and manipulative.
Constitutional law, he says he has learned, does
not develop in a vacuum: "If people think of the
federal government as the enemy and that becomes the
consensus, that consensus has the power to reshape
the workings of the constitutional system."
Until the April 19 bombing of the federal
building in Oklahoma City, the populace was close to
that anti-government consensus, Professor Bernstein
and some other scholars believe.
The bombing may not have turned that thinking
around, says Professor Bernstein, but it seems to have
given many people pause: "We saw people just like us
killed; people doing their jobs, jobs we used to think
were a good idea."
The bombing also turned the public eye to the
views of the militia movement and other fringe
groups, such as the county supremacy movement.
"Perhaps when folks hear those views, they'll say, 'The
Constitution doesn't mean that. I was upset, but I'm
not going that far,"' says Professor Bernstein.
ROLE REVERSALS
The bombing also seems to have realigned the
political players, with implications as well for the
federalism debate, notes Professor Gerhardt. In a role
reversal, Clinton administration officials are voicing
the need for expansive anti-terrorist legislation that
could infringe on civil liberties, while Republicans,
such as House Speaker Newt Gingrich, are reacting
with concern for the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable search and seizure.
The federalism debate itself is different this year,
he adds, because there is also an institutional reversal
at the national level. In the early 1980s, when the
debate was last heard, he explains, it was the
executive branch, led by President Ronald Reagan,
that was calling for a smaller federal government and
more state responsibility. Today, the legislative
branch is initiating the shift away from federal power.
Republicans have a "rather coherent view" of
federal power, says Professor Gerhardt, but the
Republican-led Congress is inconsistent on the
division of federal-state responsibilities: While
moving to federalize tort law and many crimes, areas
generally considered the province of the states,
Congress is also trying to reduce longtime federal
responsibilities for welfare, the environment and other
matters.
The Supreme Court, too, is "mirroring to some
degree the political debate; it is nowhere near a
coherent view of federalism," says court scholar
Douglas Kmiec of Notre Dame Law School. In two
recent decisions, 5-4 majorities said that Congress
exceeded its lawmaking power when it enacted a law
banning guns within 1,000 feet of a school-U.S. v.
Lopez, 93-1260-and that the states have no power to
impose term limits on members of Congress-U.S.
Term Limits v. Thornton, 93-1456.
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the
dissenters in the term limits case, articulates a fairly
formal, structural approach to federalism in which the
Constitution has enumerated powers, denials of power
and reservations of powers, Professor Kmiec notes.
"If it's not enumerated or denied, it's reserved to the
states," he says of that approach.
On the other hand, Justice John Paul Stevens,
who led the majority, was more case-specific but also
evoked a contrasting vision of the constitutional
framework, drawn from the concept of a unified
national government.
The high court is likely to face additional
federalism questions in the near future, predicts
Professor Kmiec, as the justices are drawn into the
constitutional fallout of what is now under way in
Congress and what has already passed. For example,
challenges to the federal mandate in the motor voter
registration law and to the Brady gun control law are
making their way to the court.
BRANCH WARS
A more subtle and less sexy shift in constitutional
relationships is also under way, one that could affect
the allocation of powers among the federal branches.
"On the one hand, it's clear a lot of high-profile
activity has implications for the allocation of powers,
but it's not at all clear that all of the legislation points
in the same direction," says separation-of-powers
expert Peter M. Shane, dean of the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law.
For example, he explains, Senate Majority leader
Robert Dole's proposed replacement for the War
Powers Resolution removes, in one part, substantive
controls the resolution puts on the president. "It looks
like a presidential liberation act," Dean Shane says.
But the remainder of the proposal, he adds, can be
read as a more specific restriction of the president's
use of military force than ever has been enacted. For
example, it includes restrictions on the president's
commitment of U.S. troops to U.N. command in
peacekeeping efforts.
Both the balanced budget amendment and
legislation giving the president the line-item veto, says
Dean Shane, arguably point in the direction of a
stronger executive, but their long-term effect on the
balance of powers is unpredictable.
The balanced budget amendment's impact, he
explains, depends on its enforceability-a major
sticking point in the congressional debate. The line-
item veto, rather than discouraging pork-barrel
legislation because the president stands ready with
veto pen in hand, may encourage it because the onus
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is on the president. And, the president, he says, must
weigh the knowledge that each time he exercises the
veto, he will pay the price in some congressional
district.
The Judicial Conference of the United States has
opposed the line-item veto because it fears the
judiciary's independence could be threatened if its
budget is at the mercy of the executive branch.
Legislation that would revise regulatory
procedures substantially by adding layers of
decision-making and review also implicate the.
allocation of powers, says Dean Shane, as could
Congress' decision to apply civil rights and
employment laws to itself.
"The thing I find most troubling is, there is not
much serious discussion about allocation-of-power
issues," says Dean Shane. "If the framers were around
today and laws like these were being proposed, they
would insist the most important thing to focus on
would be the distribution-of-power implications. The
idea they would make changes in substantive policy
without being attentive to allocation of power is very
strange."
AMENDMENT FEVER
The final, most direct and most visible way to
alter constitutional relationships is the Art. 5
amendment process. In the first two months of the
new congressional session, nearly 100 amendments
were proposed, many concerning a balanced federal
budget, term limits, line-item vetoes or abortion.
In the Constitution's lifetime, roughly 11,000
amendments have been proposed, a full third in the
past 26 years, says amendment scholar Professor
Bernstein. But no new amendment has emerged from
Congress since the Washington, D.C., statehood
proposal in 1978, and no amendment has emerged and
been ratified by the states since the 26th
Amendment-lowering the voting age to 18-in 1971.
The last amendment to be ratified-the 27th
Amendment, barring Congress from changing its
salary in the term in which it sits-was proposed in
1789 and ratified in 1992, he notes.
Other periods in American history have produced
"amendment spasms" but, Professor Bernstein
explains, there is a difference in the current Congress.
Many proposed amendments go to core constitutional
principles, he says, and are backed by lawmakers who
are not grandstanding for political purposes: "These
guys have been waiting on the margins for more than
40 years, but no more."
Some of the amendments-those involving flag
burning and school prayer, for instance-respond to
what their proponents see as direct challenges to a
traditional understanding of what it means to be
Americans and are an effort to end those debates by
writing their understanding into the Constitution, he
and other constitutional scholars say. Proponents see
Art. 5 as their trump card.
History proves Art. 5 can be exactly that, says
Professor Bernstein, if amendment proponents have
three things: a national consensus there is a serious
problem beyond the power of ordinary political
processes to solve; a national consensus that solution
X is the solution to that big problem; and the political
will, savvy and commitment to get it through both
houses of Congress by a two-thirds vote and ratified
by three-fourths of the states.
WON'T BE EASY
But translating a perceived consensus into an
amendment was not designed to be easy. If Congress'
failure to pass the balanced budget amendment-which
enjoyed much support-is any indication, other
proposed amendments are doomed, predicts Professor
Gerhardt.
Despite the appearance of a blizzard of
congressional action in the past six months, he adds,
not much of substance has reached the president's
desk; Congress still seems far from sending radical
budget reform, welfare reform and crime legislation to
Mr. Clinton.
"Ironically, we thought 1992 was to be the year of
change; the focus was on health care and welfare
reform," recalls Professor Gerhardt. "But lurking
within those issues were more fundamental ones: Do
we want to change not only existing laws but also
existing responsibilities at the federal level and
between federal institutions? We had been on the
edge of those issues, but now we're wrestling more
frontally with them."
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CONGRESS SEEKS WAY AROUND THE COURT
The Washington Times
Copyright 1995
Monday, July 3, 1995
Frank J. Murray
With the Supreme Court gone for summer recess,
Congress is moving to repair two key tools damaged
by its rulings.
Judiciary committees in both houses are
considering bills that declare "commerce clause"
authority to throw a federal net over guns in school
zones and to again make it illegal to lie to Congress
when not under oath.
The court's false-statement decision erased a rule
covering financial disclosures by senators,
representatives and staff members as well as
statements to congressional investigators by targets of
their probe. It is easily changed.
But the Constitution's commerce clause has been
a riddle since John Marshall headed the Supreme
Court.
The legendary chief justice - who defined
interstate commerce as that "which concerns more
states than one" - could not have expected the clause
to cost Ohio farmer Roscoe Filburn $117.11 for
growing 239 extra bushels of winter wheat to feed his
livestock.
Nor could the Constitution's framers anticipate it
would virtually nullify the 10th Amendment and
become "a blank check" for Congress, as Justice
Clarence Thomas termed it when the high court's
conservative wing sharply curbed the legislative tool
in the term that just ended by striking down the
gun-free school zones law 5-4.
Current bills, all filed before the opinion cast
doubt on how the commerce clause may be used,
invoke it to justify controlling torts, trash, television
and terror.
With the vote of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
swinging the other way, the court also thwarted 10th
Amendment advocates by overturning 23 state laws
limiting congressional terms.
The Supreme Court first told Congress it
stretched the commerce clause too far in 1870, when
it overturned a federal law banning sales of naphtha
and oils for lamps.
Then and now, courts debated - and disagreed -
over when power to regulate commerce allows the
national government to pre-empt matters that
federalism advocates argue were reserved under the
10th Amendment.
The commerce clause has been invoked by
Congress over the years to authorize food stamps,
control wages, punish cross-country sexual
adventurers and bar racial discrimination. Dozens of
pending bills cite it to justify laws that would limit
garbage shipments, curb punitive damages, forbid
abortion, promote kiwi fruit, control weeds and limit
violence on television.
"Congress has thought they could basically
legislate anywhere. Now, there is a limit," said Josh
Horowitz, legal counsel for the Coalition to Stop Gun
Violence. That group sees the ruling as a key states'
rights decision despite the incidental setback to gun
control.
Although a new gun-zone bill would require
prosecutors to prove a gun moved in interstate
commerce, many analysts believe the high court ruled
that out as well. A Senate aide said the Judicary
Committee and the Justice Department office of legal
counsel believe the rewrite will stand the test while
fulfilling President Clinton's promise to try reversing
the court on the symbolic issue.
While state protests have little practical effect
beyond signaling discontent, Colorado's legislature
formally complained about a new federal law barring
the state from regulating trucks operating solely inside
Oklahoma.
California cited the 10th Amendment in resisting
the federal voter-registration mandate for
motor-vehicle registrants. New York cited it in
winning limited Supreme Court relief from a law on
disposal of low-level nuclear waste.
The court had firmly extended the commerce
clause power to actions within one state if they affect
commerce across state lines or limit congressional
power to govern commerce. In a 1941 wheat case, the
court decided Congress' power was undermined when
Mr. Filburn, the farmer, avoided buying 239 bushels
on the open market, jeopardizing the scheme to boost
wheat prices nationwide.
Although disputed decisions date to a case
involving Robert Fulton's steamboat, analysts see the
situation as an outgrowth of New Deal judicial and
legislative zeal to repair the economy.
"If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch,
it does not matter how local the operation which
applies the squeeze," the Supreme Court said in 1949.
ENUMERATED POWERS
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution delegates
specific powers to Congress. The Tenth Amendment
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reserves all other powers "to the States, respectively,
or to the people." The so-called enumerated powers
authorize Congress to:
* Levy and collect taxes, borrow money and
provide for a common defense.
* Regulate commerce with foreign nations and
commerce among the states.
* Regulate naturalization and bankruptcy.
* Coin money, punish counterfeiters, and set
standards of weights and measures.
* Establish post offices and "post roads."
* Protect intellectual property with copyrights
and patents.
* Establisdh courts inferior to the Supreme
Court.
* Define and punis piracy, other felonies on the
high seas, and violation of international law.
* Declare war set up an army and navy,
prescribe military law, and provide for using state
militias to enforce federal law, suppress insurrections
and repel invasions.
* Govern the federal district as a seat of
government as well as federal properties elsewhere.
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PRAYER AMENDMENT UNLIKELY DESPITE PUSH FROM RIGHT
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
Copyright 1995
Monday, July 10, 1995
Robert Marshall Wells
When 10-year-old Joshua Burton brought a Bible
to his Orange County, Fla., elementary school last
March, a teacher told him he had violated the
Constitution's provisions on the separation of church
and state.
The school's principal told the fourth-grader that
he could bring his Bible to school if he read it silently
and did not discuss it with anyone. But two days
later, he was expelled after two other students
complained that he had been reading his Bible before
school.
"All I could think of doing was just to sit at my
desk and cry," Joshua said during a June 23 House
Judiciary subcommittee hearing in Tampa, Fla.
Citing a long list of similar incidents around the
country, a growing chorus of conservatives is calling
for a constitutional amendment to allow free religious
expression at schools, the display of religious
symbols and student-initiated group prayer during
sports contests, graduation ceremonies and other
events.
With Republicans controlling Congress,
proponents of school prayer believe they have their
best chance ever of returning organized religious
expression to public places. Prominent GOP House
members such as Majority Leader Dick Armey of
Texas and Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry J.
Hyde of Illinois have expressed support for the cause.
But despite the momentum provided by the GOP
electoral sweep in November, an effort to promote
school prayer through a constitutional amendment is
still a long shot.
Working against it is a calendar crowded with
other measures that are higher congressional
priorities. And, for all the high- profile advocates,
support for a constitutional amendment to restore
school prayer does not run very deep among members.
Democrats are nearly unanimous in opposition to
an amendment, contending that it is unnecessary at
best and could discourage the expression of minority
religions. President Clinton also is opposed.
And many Republicans are ambivalent,
questioning either the need for an amendment or the
potential risks in alienating moderates in their party.
"Congress reacts to complaints that are brought to
us by our constituents around the country," Rep. F.
James Sensenbrenner Jr., R-Wis., said during the
hearing in Tampa. But "I sure would like to have the
solution fall short of a constitutional amendment," he
added
LEGISLATIVE OUTLOOK
Several drafts of a proposed amendment
encouraging school prayer are circulating on Capitol
Hill. The most prominent are two almost identical
drafts proposed by the Traditional Values Coalition,
a grass-roots church lobbying organization based in
Anaheim, Calif., and by Focus on the Family, a media
ministry based in Colorado Springs, Colo., would
state that religious expression in schools or other
public places could not be abridged by states or the
federal government.
The drafts also state that the free exercise of
religion under an amended Constitution would not
constitute establishment of an official religion.
Adopting a constitutional amendment requires a
two-thirds vote of the House and Senate and approval
by three-quarters, or 38, of the states.
Michael W. McConnell, a University of Chicago
law professor who helped draft the Focus on the
Family proposal, said in an interview that an
amendment is needed because religion has been
incrementally squeezed out of public life as the
government's influence has increased over time.
Ultimately, he said, "that area of life that had been
pluralistic, all of a sudden it becomes secularized,"
McConnell said.
GOP conservative Rep. Ernest Jim Istook Jr. of
Oklahoma plans to propose a measure similar to the
amendment he introduced just before the 1994
elections. That bill stated that nothing in the
Constitution could be construed to prohibit individual
or group prayer in schools and other public
institutions. The amendment also said that no person
would be required to participate in prayer and that
neither the states nor the federal government would
compose any prayers said in public schools. (1994
Weekly Report, p. 3353)
"We are talking about permitting religious
expression, not compelling it," Istook said at a June 8
hearing in Washington of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution. "Why can
students not do voluntarily what adults can do?"
Subcommittee Chairman Charles T. Canady,
R-Fla., said he is not leaning toward any of the drafts
in particular at this point. "We are in the process of
trying to get a full understanding of the problem," he
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said in an interview. "I think we need to listen to
everybody on this issue."
In addition to the hearings in Washington and
Tampa - and one held June 10 in Harrisonburg, Va.
- the subcommittee is planning sessions in New York
City, Los Angeles and Oklahoma City.
Opponents as well as supporters are testifying,
occasionally producing lively exchanges that
underscore the difficulties facing the proposals. In
Tampa, for example, Canady had to appeal for order
several times from a crowd that was largely opposed
to amending the Constitution. The crowd at the
Harrisonburg hearing was largely supportive of an
amendment.
At the Washington hearing, committee
Democrats, including Melvin Watt of North Carolina,
contended that expressions of minority and majority
religions are already protected under current law.
"What you are saying is that you want to amend the
federal Constitution to give that control to the
majority," he said. "If everything that was in the
Constitution was done by a simple majority, then I
guess you would have a Constitution that was based
on protecting the rights of the majority."
Canady conceded that the path to a constitutional
amendment would be arduous and said other options
may have to be considered. These include attaching,
to unrelated legislation, language that would promote
school prayer but fall short of a constitutional
amendment. Such statutory language, if upheld by the
Court, could remain in effect until enactment of a
more specific constitutional amendment.
"We have to recognize that we might fail,"
Canady said. "I don't know if a statutory approach
could successfully address the problem. But that is
something that should not be rejected out of hand."
One likely avenue for such an approach would be
the fiscal 1996 appropriations bill that is scheduled
to be marked up by the Appropriations Labor, HHS,
and Education Subcommittee on July 11. "There will
be some legislating on the bill," Chairman John
Edward Porter, R-Ill., predicted in an interview. But
he also suggested that a school prayer provision may
ultimately get lost among more pressing fiscal
concerns.
"I think there's going to be so much going on,"
Porter said, "people won't be able to focus on things
like this."
In the Senate, where hearings are not yet under
way on school prayer, a constitutional amendment
would be a harder sell than in the House.
There, "religious equality" language would
probably face a filibuster from nearly all Democrats
and several Republicans, including Mark 0. Hatfield
of Oregon, Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, James M.
Jeffords of Vermont and Orrin G. Hatch of Utah.
"A PLACE AT THE TABLE"
Much of the driving force behind the effort to
amend the Constitution comes from Christian
conservatives, who played an influential role in the
1994 elections.
A "religious equality" amendment was the first
item in the "Contract With the American Family,"
which Ralph Reed, executive director of the Christian
Coalition, unveiled on Capitol Hill on May 17. The
document, patterned after the House GOP's "Contract
With America," drew praise from Republican Party
leaders. House Speaker Newt Gingrich of Georgia
and Majority Whip Tom DeLay of Texas also spoke
at the news conference. (1995 Weekly Report, p.
1448)
Later, in a June 11 appearance on ABC-TV's
"This Week With David Brinkley," Gingrich said,
"We have to bring God and the concept of a creator
back more into the public square than it has been in
recent years."
But Gingrich says he is not convinced a
constitutional amendment is required, and he is
exploring the feasibility of a statute that could
withstand a court challenge.
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole of Kansas, a
candidate for the GOP presidential nomination in
1996, has also praised the concept. But it remains
unclear whether Dole would prefer an amendment or
a statutory approach.
Reed's announcement also served to rally
opponents, however. The newly formed Coalition to
Preserve Religious Liberty, which consists of
numerous mainstream religious organizations and
interest groups such as the American Civil Liberties
Union and liberal People for the American Way, held
their own news conference the same day to underscore
their opposition.
The Rev. J. Brent Walker, general counsel for the
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs in
VWas11hington and chaiimani of tuhe coalition, concedled
that religious expression is sometimes stifled in
school settings through unwitting ignorance or
neglect. But Walker said the answer should not be
amending the Bill of Rights for the first time in more
than 200 years.
"We need to educate our educators, teach our
teachers and inform our students" about what is
permissible under current law, Walker said. "I don't
think a constitutional amendment is going to make
the line any brighter."
Jesse Choper, a professor of law at the University
of California at Berkeley, said prayer in schools
"wouldn't be the end of the world," but would have a
coercive effect on some students, especially young
children who are members of religious minorities.
"Sometimes majorities succumb to the passions of the
moment," Choper said, but "majorities don't need
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constitutional rights to protect them. They have the
political process to protect them."
FEASIBILITY DOUBTED
Others have questioned the practicality of a
school prayer amendment. Jorge Osterling, director of
community services for the Arlington County, Va.,
public schools, said an amendment could complicate
the already difficult job of educating in diverse areas
such as Arlington, where students come from more
than 50 countries and represent nearly 20 religions.
"The fact is, we cannot facilitate any public place
to pray, because if we do it for one, we have to do it
for everybody," Osterling said in an interview. "We
cannot paralyze the school by turning it into a
temple."
Still, for dedicated advocates of school prayer
nothing short of an amendment will do. "We need to
have something definitive," said Beverly LaHaye,
president of the conservative Concerned Women for
America in Washington. "The underlying conflict is
basically hostility toward religion."
In Tampa, Joshua Burton and his family are not
waiting for a constitutional amendment. With the
help of an Orlando law firm specializing in religious
liberty cases, the family has sued the school in federal
district court.
Joshua's father, Mark Burton, who also testified
at the Tampa hearing, said that parents need help
raising their children in a socially fraying society that
seems increasingly hostile toward religion.
"It seems to me," he said, "that in this age where
children are taught by the state school system that
they must be tolerant of racial differences, tolerant of
homosexuality, tolerant of political differences and
tolerant of cultural and language diversity, that this
same system should be tolerant when it comes to
religious freedom."
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HOUSE APPROVES AMENDMENT ON FLAG DESECRATION
Measure Would Override High Court Rulings,
Let States and Congress Outlaw the Act
The Washington Post
Copyright 1995
Thursday, June 29, 1995
Kenneth J. Cooper
-Washington Post Staff Writer
The House yesterday endorsed for the first time
a proposed constitutional amendment that would
permit Congress and the states to outlaw "physical
desecration" of the U.S. flag.
Citing strong support in state legislatures and
public opinion polls, lawmakers backed the
so-called flag-burning amendment, 312 to 120,
surpassing by 24 votes the two-thirds majority
needed to approve a constitutional amendment. A
floor vote has not been scheduled in the Senate,
where preliminary counts show support falling short
of the supermajority required to send the issue to the
states.
The proposed amendment, sponsored in the
House by Rules Committee Chairman Gerald B.H.
Solomon (R-N.Y.), would overturn a pair of
Supreme Court rulings in 1989 and 1990 that struck
down flag desecration laws as unconstitutional
violations of individual rights to free speech.
Approval of the amendment in the
Republican-controlled House shows how much
sentiment has changed since the identical
amendment was rejected in 1990 by 34 votes, 254 to
177. That vote in a Democratic-controlled House
effectively killed any congressional movement to
outlaw flag desecration until this year.
On a vote that House GOP leaders timed to
come a week before the Fourth of July recess, the
amendment was supported by 219 Republicans and
YJ Jemocrats but opposed buy 107 Democrats, 12
Republicans and one independent. Three lawmakers
did not vote.
The amendment reads: "The Congress and the
states shall have the power to prohibit the physical
desecration of the flag of the United States."
Yesterday's debate, less dramatic and half as
long as the seven-hour debate in 1990, saw both
sides invoke patriotic symbols with references to
military service or immigrant heritage and displays
of copies of the Constitution and images of the flag.
Supporters emphasized that 49 states, every one
but Vermont, have passed resolutions calling for
Congress to approve a constitutional amendment,
which has about 75 percent support in polls. If the
amendment is also passed in the Senate, it would
have to be ratified by 38 states to become part of the
Constitution.
In keeping with the argument they have made on
other legislation, Republicans maintained that the
question of whether to outlaw flag desecration
should be left to the states, not the unelected justices
of the Supreme Court in this instance. "Let the states
decide," freshman Rep. David Funderburk (R-N.C.)
urged.
"We are responding to the will of the
overwhelming majority of the American people by
restoring to the states and the Congress the power to
protect the flag of this nation," Solomon said. "The
flag of the United States is the most important
symbol that we have. It is what makes us all
Americans, regardless of where we came from."
Freshman Rep. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)
suggested an altemate object for antigovernment ire.
"If you feel the need to burn something, burn your
congressman in effigy. Burn me," he said.
House Judiciary Chairman Henry J. Hyde
(R-ll.) compared a ban on flag-burning to limits on
speech based on obscenity, libel, perjury and other
laws. "Somebody tell me why it's a federal crime to
burn a $20 bill, but it's okay to burn a flag?" he
said.
But opponents including the administration
argued that the amendment would restrict political
speech protected by the First Amendment and make
the first revision in the Bill of Rights since it was
adopted in 1792. Of flag-burning, Rep. Anthony C.
Beilenson (D-Calif.) said: "This is unpopular
expression. But it deserves protection no matter how
much we may deplore it." Rep. Wayne T. Gilchrest
(R-Md.) accused the House of "confusing the flag
with what it symbolizes" because "the flag isn't more
important than the Constitution."
Critics also cited data compiled by the
Congressional Research Service that show
flag-burning to be infrequent, with three incidents
reported last year and none in 1993. Beilenson urged
that "misfits who desecrate our flag remain in
obscurity, where they deserve to be."
Reps. Jose E. Serrano (D-N.Y.) and Gary L.
Ackerman (D-N.Y.) used items bearing flag designs
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as props in questioning the definition of"flag" and
"desecration" under the amendment.
"How about flag napkins?" Ackerman asked,
pulling a handful from a cardboard box. "You blow
your nose in one, have you broken the law?"
Serrano, after asking whether the amendment
would cover "cake made out to look like the
American flag" or a sweaty soccer T-shirt with a flag
pictured on it, concluded: "If this flag could speak to
us, it probably would tell us to stop this silly debate
and to do what it stands for," like feed hungry
children, care for the elderly and abandon racial
prejudice.
In the Senate, Judiciary Chairman Orrin G.
Hatch (R-Utah) said the amendment has 56
cosponsors and stands a "reasonable chance" of
gaining the needed support from 67 senators when
a vote is taken "probably next year." Congressional
Quarterly recently counted 63 supporters in the
Senate but also 34 opponents -- enough to block
passage.
Majority Whip Trent Lou (R-Miss.) suggested
it would be tough to pass the amendment, saying,
"That's a big day's work in the Senate."
THE AMENDMENT
The one-sentence amendment approved by the
House yesterday reads:
"The Congress and the states shall
have the power to prohibit the physical
desecration of the flag of the United
States."
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WHAT'S CONSERVATIVE ABOUT AMENDING THE BILL OF RIGHTS?
The News & Observer Raleigh, NC, Monday, June 12, 1995
Washington Post Writers Group, Copyright 1995
Edwin M. Yoder Jr.
Washington - A brother columnist, Robert
Samuelson of Newsweek, recently resurrected the
useful old term "pseudo-conservative" from a
slumber that has lasted nearly as long as Rip Van
Winkle's.
But the timing is excellent, for
pseudo-conservatism is again on the march. When
last revived in the early 1950s by the historian
Richard Hoftadter, "pseudo-conservatism" signified
populistic restlessness of a radical tenor. Among its
symptoms, Hofstadter noted, was "a flood of
proposals to write drastic changes into the body of
our fundamental law"--to amend the Constitution.
Well, welcome to pseudo-conservatism, 1995
vintage. The amendment craze is astir again.
Proposed constitutional improvements to soothe this
or that current political grievance abound. Some are
too silly to be taken seriously. But at least three -- to
impose federal legislative term limits; to permit
prayer in schools; and to protect the American flag
against "desecration" -- are getting serious attention
in this Congress.
A good constitutionalist, I guess, can take or
leave a congressional term-limits amendment, which
differs little in principle from the 22nd Amendment
limiting presidents to two terms.
But tampering with the First Amendment is
another story, and that is what. school prayer and
flag-burning amendments would entail. The First
Amendment is the foundation stone of both
church-state separation and of free speech. Just how
drastically the suggested amendments would affect
the First Amendment is uncertain.
Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger,
formerly of Duke University and now head of the
Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, in
June 6 testimony to the Senate Judiciary
subcommittee on the Constitution, cautioned that
this "first-time edit" of the Bill of Rights would
carry us into "uncharted territory," with incalculable
effect on fundamental personal liberties.
Dellinger, in observing that the Bill of Rights
has never been amended in the 202 years of its
history, added: "This is no historical accident ...
Rather, our historic unwillingness to tamper with the
Bill of Rights reflects a reverence for the
Constitution that is both entirely appropriate and
fundamentally at odds with turning that document
into a forum for divisive political battles."
James Madison, father of the Bill of Rights,
thought that constitutional amendment should be
limited to "great and extraordinary occasions."
Scattered abuse of the flag in the name of political
protest offers no such occasion, Dellinger argued;
and he is right.
The Supreme Court's 1989 decision in a
flag-burning case known as Texas vs. Johnson left
the impression that it was novel judicial doctrine to
permit the flag to be used -- or abused - in political
contexts. But it wasn't. The 1989 decision built
upon a line of prior decisions in which the court,
without directly reaching the First Amendment issue,
found fault with a variety of laws and ordinances
prohibiting the use of the flag in symbolic
expression. The Texas supreme court, incidentally,
was of the same view.
It is ironic that self-styled conservatives should
be leading the movement to reverse the court in
these delicate areas of personal liberty. In the
English-speaking world, conservatism was
classically defined by the 18th-century statesman
Edmund Burke, whose fundamental teaching was
that sound societies should evolve incrementally and
organically. Hence the true conservative abhors
sudden or radical change, above all in basic
constitutional practices.
And other procedural issues are implicated too.
For two centuries, the meaning of the First
Amendment has been exclusively decided by jurists
protected by life tenure from raw political passions.
That insulation is of the essence of American
constitutionalism, especially when ultra-sensitive
issues of free speech and religious preference are
concerned. Tinkering with the First Amendment isn't
conservatism, whatever values are invoked in its
defense. It is pseudo-conservatism - in the pure
state.
At any given hour, scores of shortsighted
constitutional amendments are waiting in the wings.
Amendment on the scale proposed by some eminent
pseudo-conservatives today could become
habit-forming, transforming the Constitution from
an anchor of stability into a patchwork of this
generation's impulsive grievances.
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